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I. INTRODUCTION
In my work as a lawyer and a policy coordinator for the Catholic
Church in the United States, I have noticed that the terms of Catholic Social
Teaching are used frequently in the legal and policy debate over religious
freedom—but they are also used loosely, even in Catholic circles, and this
loose usage has practical consequences.
I recently came across some research that confirmed my experience.
Andreas Widmer at Catholic University of America surveyed Catholics and
non-Catholics to assess their familiarity with the key terms of Catholic So-
cial Teaching. In general, he found that Catholics who responded to his
* Associate General Secretary and General Counsel, United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops (USCCB). These reflections are my own, and they do not represent the views of my
employer.
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survey said—in high percentages—that they knew the meaning of those
key terms but then supplied definitions that were overwhelmingly wrong.1
The most misunderstood key term is the “common good,” which was
the focus of the University of St. Thomas Law Journal Spring 2018 Relig-
ious Freedom and Common Good Symposium. Only about 15 percent of
Catholics said they did not know what the “common good” meant, but only
about 10 percent actually did know the basic definition.2 So fully, 75 per-
cent of those surveyed thought they knew what the term “common good”
meant, but actually did not know.3
I do not come to this problem as someone who is familiar with every
nuance of Catholic Social Teaching and is looking to quibble over the mar-
gins of the definitions of its key terms. The point is almost the opposite: in
the context of the legal and policy discourse on religious freedom, the defi-
ciencies surrounding the use of the term “common good” are so great that
they are apparent even to a relative amateur like me—and they have be-
come apparent precisely through their practical consequences.
In short, the problem is this: in legal and policy discourse, religious
freedom is mostly cast as opposed to the common good;4 and when it is cast
as advancing the common good, it is only to the extent that it is perceived
as facilitating service to the needy. I think this miscasting has come about
as a result of several contributing causes, but one of them is a widespread
understanding of the “common good” that is, at best, incomplete.
Yes, religious freedom does serve the common good by facilitating aid
to the needy, and helping the poor is a privileged form of service to the
common good; but there is much more to the common good than charitable
service, and religious freedom advances those other aspects of the common
good as well. And yes, the common good represents a limit on religious
exercise; but that does not imply that the two are somehow inherently op-
posed. In fact, the two are inherently interdependent. Any plausible defini-
tion of religious freedom implies at least some minimal concept of the
common good, as both a source and a limit; and, as will be explained fur-
ther below, the concept of the common good in Catholic Social Teaching
prominently includes religious freedom.
My hope is to present through this article a more nearly complete, if
still rudimentary, account of the “common good” in Catholic Social Teach-
ing, and then to describe how its various elements relate to contemporary
1. Andreas Widmer, How do we live the vocation to business, starting today?, LIBERTY &
SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (Sept. 24–26, 2014), http://business.cua.edu/res/docs/
Widmer-L-S.pdf.
2. Id. at 104 (Table 2).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Sharita Gruberg, et al., Religious Liberty for a Select Few, CTR. FOR AM. PRO-
GRESS (Apr. 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/reports/2018/04/03/448773/
religious-liberty-select/.
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legal and policy debates over religious freedom. I will discuss those ele-
ments of the common good that are routinely invoked in religious freedom
discourse; the benefits that flow from highlighting those elements; and the
problems that flow from highlighting them in isolation. I will also discuss
the elements of the common good that are routinely overlooked in religious
freedom discourse; the harms that flow from their exclusion; and the corre-
sponding benefits of including them in the future.
Once all of these pieces are put in place, I hope the result will be a
clearer and more cohesive picture of the relationship between religious free-
dom and the common good, reflecting that the two are, in fact, integrally
linked, interdependent, and inseparable.
II. DEFINING THE “COMMON GOOD”
A good place to start is the basic definition of “common good” that 75
percent of Catholics thought they knew but actually did not. The latest and
best distillation comes from Vatican II’s Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, which is repeated in the
Catechism of the Catholic Church and the Compendium: “the sum total of
social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to
reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily.”5 This definition is in-
deed a distillation—that is, its content is not new with Gaudium et Spes, but
it reaches back to Pope Leo XIII’s foundational encyclical of modern Cath-
olic Social Teaching, Rerum Novarum, and beyond, and packs a lot into a
little sentence.6
Tomes could be written to unpack this definition further, but in keep-
ing with the title and overall theme of this article, I want to focus on one
aspect of the definition, namely, that it represents a “sum total.” As noted
above, that focus is important because more common understandings of
“common good” seem to be incomplete—“partial totals,” or maybe
“subtotals.”
A. An Indivisible Whole
The idea of aggregating all the goods of various individuals and
groups in society might, however, leave the impression that the common
good can also be somehow disaggregated—but that is not the case. Con-
cepts of completeness, wholeness, and continuity over time pervade the
5. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE
OF THE CHURCH para. 164 (2006) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]; CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH para. 1906 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter CATECHISM]; SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL
COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD: GAUDIUM ET SPES
paras. 26, 74 (1965) [herinafter GAUDIUM ET SPES].
6. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA: CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS
para. 65 (1961); POPE LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM para. 51 (1891) [hereinafter RERUM
NOVARUM].
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idea of the common good; there is a certain gestalt to it. As the Compen-
dium puts it: “Belonging to everyone and to each person, [the common
good] is and remains ‘common,’ because it is indivisible and because only
together is it possible to attain it, increase it and safeguard its effectiveness,
with regard also to the future.”7
B. Three Main Components
The definition of “common good” in Catholic Social Teaching is not
limited to the single sentence excerpted above. Three component parts are
also specified: (1) respect for the dignity of the human person; (2) social
well-being and development; and (3) peace and security.8 I will describe
each briefly in turn.
1. Dignity of the Human Person
Respect for each individual person is fundamental to the common
good: “The principle of the common good . . . stems from the dignity, unity
and equality of all people.”9 Therefore, if one attempts to pursue the com-
mon good by means that violate the dignity of the human person, those
means immediately thwart the end, and the effort inherently fails.
Respecting the dignity of the person has many requirements,10 and I
am loath to omit any, especially in light of my broader theme of complete-
ness in treating the elements of the common good.11 One facet of respect
for human dignity that stands out, however, is the requirement to respect
conscience and to protect religious freedom. The Catechism does not leave
this point to inference and risk that it may get lost in a sea of other protec-
tions, but rather specifies it:
In particular, the common good resides in the conditions for the
exercise of the natural freedoms indispensable for the develop-
ment of the human vocation, such as “the right to act according to
a sound norm of conscience and to safeguard . . . privacy, and
rightful freedom also in matters of religion.”12
7. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5. See also id. at para. 162 (“The principles of the Church’s
social doctrine must be appreciated in their unity, interrelatedness and articulation.”).
8. CATECHISM, supra note 5, at paras. 1907–09, 1925.
9. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
10. For example, GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 5, at para. 26, lists the following in addition
to freedom of conscience and religious freedom: “food, clothing, and shelter; the right to choose a
state of life freely and to found a family, the right to education, to employment, to a good reputa-
tion, to respect, [and] to appropriate information . . . .” Similarly, the COMPENDIUM, supra note 5,
at para. 166, specifies “food, housing, work, education and access to culture, transportation, basic
health care, the freedom of communication and expression . . . .”
11. See, e.g., COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at para. 154 (“Human rights are to be defended not
only individually but also as a whole: protecting them only partially would imply a kind of failure
to recognize them.”).
12. CATECHISM, supra note 5, at para. 1907 (quoting GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 5, at para.
26).
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Likewise, in the Compendium, “[e]mphasis is given to the paramount
value of the right to religious freedom.”13 The Compendium later affirms
that “[t]he effective recognition of the right to freedom of conscience and
religious freedom is one of the highest goods and one of the most serious
duties of every people that truly wishes to ensure the good of the individual
and of society.”14
And, of course, the source of the right to religious freedom in Catholic
Social Teaching is the dignity of the human person, as explained in the
document of the Second Vatican Council declaring that right, which is aptly
titled, Dignitatis Humanae.15 The common good therefore does not merely
include, but is rooted in, respect for the dignity of the human person, and
that respect requires the protection of conscience and religious freedom.
2. Social Well-Being and Social Development
The emphasis in Catholic Social Teaching on the primacy of the dig-
nity and value of the human person—which is prior to any claim of society
or the state16—does not lead to a libertarian anthropology or radical indi-
vidualism because the social nature of the human person is also affirmed:
“The human person cannot find fulfilment . . . apart from the fact that he
exists ‘with’ others and ‘for’ others.”17 The pursuit of the social dimension
of the common good is therefore not at odds with the good of the individual
person, but instead advances and is indispensable to the good of the individ-
ual person.18
Social well-being and development are achieved through individuals’
active participation in social groups, in pursuit of goods that are unattaina-
ble by individuals acting in isolation.19 In the private sector, these social
13. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at para. 155.
14. Id. at para. 553.
15. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE para. 2 (1965) (“[T]he right to relig-
ious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known
through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.”).
16. RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 6, at para. 7 (“Man precedes the state.”); CATECHISM,
supra note 5, at para. 1930 (“Respect for the human person entails respect for the rights that flow
from his dignity as a creature. These rights are prior to society and must be recognized by it.”).
17. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at para. 165.
18. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at para. 106 (“The origin of social life is therefore found in
the human person, and society cannot refuse to recognize its active and responsible subject; every
expression of society must be directed towards the human person.”); GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra
note 5, at para. 26 (“Hence, the social order and its development must invariably work to the
benefit of the human person if the disposition of affairs is to be subordinate to the personal realm
and not contrariwise, as the Lord indicated when He said that the Sabbath was made for man, and
not man for the Sabbath.”).
19. CATECHISM, supra note 5, at para. 1882 (noting “the natural tendency for human beings
to associate with one another for the sake of attaining objectives that exceed individual capaci-
ties”); CATECHISM, supra note 5, at para. 1936 (“On coming into the world, man is not equipped
with everything he needs for developing his bodily and spiritual life. He needs others.”); GAUDIUM
ET SPES, supra note 5, at para. 25 (“[T]he subject and the goal of all social institutions is and must
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groups include families, schools, churches, charities, labor unions, sports
teams, social clubs, corporations, or other voluntary associations; in the
public sector, they are towns, cities, counties, states, federal government,
and even the community of nations.20 For all their diversity, these institu-
tions are all different forms of expression of social life.21
The state serves as something of a referee among these various social
groups. Social justice consists of assuring that all of these groups—families,
schools, businesses, etc.—get their due.22 Although all individuals and
groups are charged with contributing to and maintaining the common good,
it is ultimately the role of the state to manage competing claims of what
each individual and group is due, and so “to ensure as far as possible the
common good of the society.”23
Religious groups are among the social groups subject to the decisions
of the state in adjudicating competing claims among groups. But religious
groups are not simply one among many, as religious exercise contributes to
the healthy integration of various groups within the social fabric, contribut-
ing to social justice well prior to the engagement of the state. Dignitatis
Humanae repeatedly emphasizes the inherently social nature of religious
activities—including education, family life, worship, public proclamation
of the faith, mutual aid, and the establishment of institutions24—and these
contribute mightily to social development. Saint Pope John Paul II summa-
rizes well the relationship between the freedom to participate in these vari-
ous social groups and religious freedom:
the right to live in a united family and in a moral environment
conducive to the growth of the child’s personality; the right to
develop one’s intelligence and freedom in seeking and knowing
the truth; the right to share in the work which makes wise use of
the earth’s material resources, and to derive from that work the
means to support oneself and one’s dependents; and the right
freely to establish a family, to have and to rear children through
the responsible exercise of one’s sexuality. In a certain sense, the
source and synthesis of these rights is religious freedom, under-
be the human person which for its part and by its very nature stands completely in need of social
life.”).
20. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at para. 168 (“The individual person, the family or inter-
mediate groups are not able to achieve their full development by themselves for living a truly
human life. Hence the necessity of political institutions, the purpose of which is to make available
to persons the necessary material, cultural, moral and spiritual goods.”); id. at para. 384 (“The
political community, a reality inherent in mankind, exists to achieve an end otherwise unobtain-
able: the full growth of each of its members, called to cooperate steadfastly for the attainment of
the common good, under the impulse of their natural inclinations towards what is true and
good.”).
21. Id. at para. 151.
22. Id. at para. 165.
23. CATECHISM, supra note 5, at paras. 1898, 1910.
24. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 15, at paras. 3–7.
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stood as the right to live in the truth of one’s faith and in con-
formity with one’s transcendent dignity as a person.25
The continuing focus on the transcendent dignity of the person pre-
vents this concept of social well-being and development from being re-
duced to merely socio-economic well-being and development.26 At the
same time, socio-economic well-being and development is critical to the
common good—while insufficient alone to achieve this end, it is certainly
necessary. When individual persons cannot secure for themselves their most
basic needs as befits their inherent dignity—needs such as food, clothing,
housing, healthcare, education, and the like—it is only by social interaction,
in the form of the assistance of their neighbors, acting individually or as
groups, that they will come to receive those goods.27
Corresponding to this is a principle of Catholic Social Teaching called
the “preferential option for the poor,” which Saint Pope John Paul II de-
scribed as follows:
This is an option, or a special form of primacy in the exercise of
Christian charity, to which the whole tradition of the Church
bears witness. It affects the life of each Christian inasmuch as he
or she seeks to imitate the life of Christ, but it applies equally to
our social responsibilities and hence to our manner of living, and
to the logical decisions to be made concerning the ownership and
use of goods.28
In sum, the social well-being and development component of the common
good underscores that each human person is a social being who both re-
quires the service of, and is required to serve, his neighbor. This obligation
of service is strongest with respect to the poorest and most vulnerable, and
is not limited to meeting material needs and promoting material flourishing,
but extends to relational and spiritual needs and flourishing as well.
25. SAINT POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS para. 47 (1991) [hereinafter CENTESIMUS
ANNUS].
26. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at para. 170 (“A purely historical and materialistic vision
would end up transforming the common good into a simple socio-economic well-being, without
any transcendental goal, that is, without its most intimate reason for existing.”); id. at para. 334
(“Development, in fact, cannot be reduced to a mere process of accumulating goods and services.
On the contrary, accumulation by itself, even were it for the common good, is not a sufficient
condition for bringing about authentic human happiness.”); CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 25, at
para. 29. (“[D]evelopment must not be understood solely in economic terms, but in a way that is
fully human. . . . The apex of development is the exercise of the right and duty to seek God, to
know him and to live in accordance with that knowledge.”); POPE JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICITUDO REI
SOCIALIS para. 33 (1987) [hereinafter SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS].
27. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 25, at para. 49 (noting the need for “a concrete commit-
ment to solidarity and charity,” which finds expression in families, and in the charitable activities
of the Church and other “intermediate communities.”).
28. SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 26, at para. 42. See also COMPENDIUM, supra note
5, at para. 42. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 25, at para. 11.
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3. Peace and Security
The third and last major element of the common good is “peace, that
is, the stability and security of a just order.”29 As Pope Leo XIII common-
sensically explained, “it is to the interest of the community, as well as of the
individual, that that peace and good order should be maintained.”30 But this
peace may only be secured by morally acceptable means.31
And as the Compendium explains, one of the most important ways to
maintain peace is to maintain justice:
Peace is threatened when man is not given all that is due him as a
human person, when his dignity is not respected and when civil
life is not directed to the common good. The defence and promo-
tion of human rights is essential for the building up of a peaceful
society and the integral development of individuals, peoples and
nations.32
Or, in Saint Pope Paul VI’s famous formulation, “If you want peace, work
for justice.”33
Catholic Social Teaching also identifies keeping the peace as one of
the “just limits” on the exercise of religion, including “the need for the
effective safeguard of the rights of all citizens and for the peaceful settle-
ment of conflicts of rights, also out of the need for an adequate care of
genuine public peace.”34 Similarly, the “just demands of the public order”
may properly limit religious exercise.35
III. THE “COMMON GOOD” IN CURRENT DISCOURSE
Having surveyed the basic definition of the “common good” and its
three essential elements—respect for the dignity of the human person, so-
cial well-being and development, and peace and security—and highlighting
along the way their connections to religious freedom, I would now like to
address how these concepts relate to our current legal and policy discourse
over religious freedom. First, I will discuss the elements that have been
present in the discourse, and then I will turn to those that have been absent.
29. CATECHISM, supra note 5, at para. 1909.
30. RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 6, at para. 36.
31. CATECHISM, supra note 5, at para. 1909.
32. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at para. 494.
33. SAINT POPE PAUL VI, IF YOU WANT PEACE, WORK FOR JUSTICE (1972), http://w2.vatican
.va/content/paul-vi/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_p-vi_mes_19711208_v-world-day-for-peace
.html; SAINT POPE FRANCIS, EVANGELII GAUDIUM para. 219 (2013) (“In the end, a peace which is
not the result of integral development will be doomed; it will always spawn new conflicts and
various forms of violence.”).
34. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 15, at para. 7; COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at para.
422.
35. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 15, at paras. 2–4, 7.
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A. Elements of the Concept That Are Present in Current Discourse
Especially in legal discourse, religious freedom is cast as a balancing
of interests—the interests of those engaged in religious exercise on the one
hand, and the interests of the government on the other. For example, in the
analysis under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), if
the burden on religious exercise is deemed “substantial,” it triggers strict
scrutiny, which requires the government to show that the burden represents
the “least restrictive means” of serving a “compelling governmental inter-
est.”36 Similarly, a Catholic understanding of religious freedom is limited
by the “just demands of the public order.”37
The resonance between the two is substantial. First and most funda-
mentally, both reflect that the right to religious freedom is not absolute or
boundless—the Catholic understanding of religious freedom is not based on
radical individualism, but instead recognizes the inherently social nature of
the human person and the value of social peace. Second, both limits would
give religious freedom a wide berth. In civil law, only “paramount inter-
ests” of “the highest order” qualify for the designation of “compelling.”38
Likewise, the “just demands of the public order” should be applied so that
“the freedom of man is to be respected as far as possible and is not to be
curtailed except when and insofar as necessary.”39
Although this resonance presents an opportunity to highlight the con-
nection between the common good and religious freedom, it also presents a
peril. In particular, I think framing the issue as one of religious exercise
versus governmental interest leaves the impression that religious freedom is
at odds with the common good. Although such conflicts may indeed arise at
the margins, they are not the norm—the relationship of religious freedom to
the “common good” as understood in Catholic Social Teaching is over-
whelmingly harmonious. Indeed, as described above, religious freedom is a
major constitutive element of the common good, indispensable to it and
arguably its apotheosis.40
In our public policy discourse, the United States Conference of Catho-
lic Bishops (USCCB) and others have emphasized that religious freedom
affords the Church the “freedom to serve,” particularly the poor and others
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (1997).
37. See DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 15, at paras. 2–4, 7.
38. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
39. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 15, at para. 7. At a minimum, the state’s definition
“public order” must meet what might be considered a standard of basic rationality under civil law.
That is, public order must not be defined “in an arbitrary fashion or in an unfair spirit of partisan-
ship,” but instead “be controlled by juridical norms which are in conformity with the objective
moral order.” Id. But additional elements of the definition indicate a more demanding standard for
the state. That is, public order must also “arise out of the need for the effective safeguard of the
rights of all citizens and for the peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights, . . . [for] genuine public
peace, . . . and . . . for a proper guardianship of public morality.” Id.
40. See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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most in need.41 Although there are many examples of the charitable works
of the Church being threatened by the deprivation of religious freedom, the
most prominent would be the threat to the work of the Little Sisters of the
Poor, who provide nursing care for the elderly poor. Like many other Cath-
olic charitable organizations, the Little Sisters could not comply in con-
science with the regulatory mandate to provide its employees with health
coverage for all FDA-approved methods of contraception, which includes
sterilizations and some abortifacient drugs and devices;42 and like those
many others, the Little Sisters sued to challenge that mandate under RFRA
and the First Amendment.43
I think the “freedom to serve” approach has been helpful, as far as it
goes, in that it highlights one especially important and compelling way in
which religious freedom does serve the common good—namely, exercising
the preferential option for the poor.44 On the other hand, it risks the impres-
41. For example, the educational and advocacy efforts of the USCCB Committee for Relig-
ious Liberty (and the Ad Hoc Committee that preceded it) have used the phrase pervasively. The
Committee’s monthly e-mailed newsletter is entitled “Free to Serve.” See Free to Serve: Monthly
E-Newsletter, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-
action/religious-liberty/free-to-serve.cfm. “Freedom to Serve” was the theme for the third annual
“Fortnight for Freedom,” which was observed in 2014. Third Fortnight for Freedom to be Ob-
served June 21–July 4, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.usccb.org/
news/2014/14-069.cfm. A series of bulletin inserts addressed the “freedom to serve” in a range of
areas where it is or has been threatened. See, e.g., United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,
Freedom to serve through education, FORTNIGHT FOR FREEDOM (2017), http://www.usccb.org/
issues-and-action/religious-liberty/fortnight-for-freedom/upload/8-Education.pdf; United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops, Freedom to serve migrants and refugees, FORTNIGHT FOR FREE-
DOM (2017), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/fortnight-for-freedom/up
load/1-Migrants-and-Refugees.pdf; United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Freedom to
serve the vulnerable, FORTNIGHT FOR FREEDOM (2017), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/re
ligious-liberty/fortnight-for-freedom/upload/11-Freedom-to-serve-the-vulnerable.pdf.
42. The Affordable Care Act requires group health insurance plans to include coverage for
certain “preventive health services” for women. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg–13(a)(4) (2019). Pursu-
ant to subsequent regulations issued by several federal agencies, the statutory “preventive ser-
vices” mandate was construed to include the full range of FDA-approved contraceptive drugs and
devices. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv) (2019); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv)
(2017); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2017). See also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
BIRTH CONTROL CHART (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/99605/download (describing
FDA-approved methods of contraception, including various methods of sterilization and drugs and
devices that may interfere with implantation).
43. See Case Detail: Little Sisters of the Poor v. Azar, BECKET LAW (Sept. 9, 2019), https://
www.becketlaw.org/case/littlesisters (summarizing years of federal litigation associated with the
Little Sisters’ challenge to the sterilization, contraception, and abortifacient mandate). See also
Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (granting, vacating, and remanding, inter alia, adverse
decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged,
Denver, Colo. v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015)). See also David Gibson, Catholic
groups file suit over HHS birth control mandate, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE (May 21, 2012) https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/catholic-groups-file-suit-over-hhs-birth-control-man
date/2012/05/21/gIQAtVrFgU_story.html (describing wave of lawsuits filed by Catholic nonprofit
entities challenging sterilization, contraception, and abortifacient mandate).
44. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 25, at para. 57 (“Today more than ever, the Church is
aware that her social message will gain credibility more immediately from the witness of actions
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sion that religious freedom is only worth protecting to the extent it facili-
tates charitable works, and more particularly, charitable works that enjoy
broad public support. Not all do. For example, after decades of bipartisan
support, the USCCB’s long-standing work in resettling refugees has fallen
out of favor recently.45 Further, it is not only charitable works, popular or
unpopular, that contribute to the common good. For-profit enterprises can
contribute substantially as well, by providing employment, facilitating the
cultivation of human talents and creativity, and generating necessary goods
and services.46 These enterprises also have the capacity to engage in relig-
ious expression and religiously-motivated action.47
B. Elements of the Concept That Are Absent from Current Discourse
Next, I address the elements of the common good that have been miss-
ing from the legal and policy discourse over religious freedom, with the
hope of plugging those gaps and, in turn, promoting usage of the term
“common good” that more nearly encompasses the “sum total” of its
elements.
First and foremost, it seems that the direct connection of religious free-
dom to respect for the dignity of the human person—the first of the three
essential elements of the common good—has been virtually absent from
either the legal or public policy discussion of religious freedom. It does not
seem a stretch to argue that the protection of fundamental human rights is
an element of the common good and that religious freedom is one of those
fundamental rights. But I do not think the public argument about religious
freedom has commonly been cast in those terms. In the future, it should be.
Second, the role of religious freedom in facilitating a wide range of
social goods—not just charitable work—has not been discussed widely or
otherwise received the attention it deserves. Family life, education, the ethi-
cal conduct of business, to name just a few examples, are also enabled by
religious freedom, and all are activities that promote social development
and well-being, which is the second essential element of the common good.
Though it is beyond the scope of this study, it would be worthwhile to trace
than as a result of its internal logic and consistency. This awareness is also a source of her prefer-
ential option for the poor . . . .”).
45. See, e.g., Julie Asher, Agencies ‘appalled’ by reports U.S. could end refugee admissions,
CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE (July 20, 2019), https://angelusnews.com/news/julie-asher/agencies-ap
palled-by-reports-u-s-could-end-refugee-admissions. Ted Hesson, Trump officials pressing to
slash refugee admissions to zero next year, POLITICO (July 18, 2019), https://www.politico.com/
story/2019/07/18/trump-officials-refugee-zero-1603503.
46. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 25, at para. 43 (describing collaborative and creative
nature of human work and its value in providing for human needs). See also id. (noting that
Catholic Social Teaching “recognizes the positive value of the market and of enterprise, but which
at the same time points out that these need to be oriented towards the common good.”).
47. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 692–93 (2014) (affirming
that closely-held, for-profit corporations may engage in religious exercise protected by the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 and rejecting numerous arguments to the contrary).
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out in detail the causal chain between religious freedom, the vitality of these
mediating institutions, the abundance of their fruits, and the common good
in full. This not only would promote a better understanding of religious
freedom and the common good among the faithful and the public—which is
an end in itself—but would also provide the basis for more persuasive pub-
lic arguments claiming that religious freedom serves the common good.
Third and finally, the protection of religious freedom also protects
peace, the third essential element of the common good. The failure to pro-
tect religious freedom is an injustice, which in turn threatens social peace.48
Or, with apologies to Paul VI, if you want peace, work for religious free-
dom. I do not think we are remotely close to a breakdown of public order
over religious freedom in the United States. But we would do well to recog-
nize that the durable social peace we enjoy today likely owes much to the
respect for the religious diversity that the laws and traditions of the United
States have generally afforded. Contemporary situations around the
world,49 and even anomalous situations from our own nation’s past,50 dra-
matically illustrate the connection between the denial of religious freedom
and major disruptions of social order.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the concept of the “common good” in Catholic Social Teach-
ing is frequently invoked in contemporary debates over religious freedom
but is not well understood. It is a multi-faceted gem, and while many of
those facets have been recognized and duly appreciated, others are simply
ignored. My hope, in this brief essay, has been to affirm the recognition and
appreciation where they exist and promote them where they do not, thereby
advancing both religious freedom and the common good.
48. See generally BRIAN J. GRIM AND ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIG-
IOUS PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011) (presenting data show-
ing correlation of restrictions on religious exercise with violence and social instability).
49. See, e.g., John Hudson, Obama Administration Declares Islamic State Genocide Against
Christians, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 17, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/17/obama-admini
stration-declares-islamic-state-genocide-against-christians/. United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops, Central African Republic: Christian and Muslim Religious Leaders Work for Peace,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2019), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-lib
erty/upload/Central-African-Republic-Backgrounder.pdf (describing situation of dramatic civil
disorder arising out of religious intolerance unrest, and corresponding inter-religious efforts to
restore civil society and bring peace to people of all faiths).
50. See, e.g., Carmine A. Prioli, The Ursuline Outrage, 33 AMERICAN HERITAGE 22
(Feb–Mar 1982) (describing riots at the Ursuline Convent in Charlestown, Massachusetts on Au-
gust 11–12, 1834, driven by prejudicial suspicions of Catholics); Elizabeth M. Geffen, Violence in
Philadelphia in the 1840’s and 1850’s, 36 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY: A JOURNAL OF MID-ATLAN-
TIC STUDIES 4 (1969) (describing riots in Philadelphia on May 6–8 and July 6–7, 1844, involving
the burning of two Catholic churches, driven by controversy over the requirement that Catholic
students had to read from the Protestant Bible in public schools).
